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The United States’ Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB), formerly US Patent and Trademark Office’s
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI),1 de-
cided a highly contested interference proceeding con-
cerning the Type-II CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing
technology in February 2017.2 Clustered regularly inter-
spaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) has been
hailed as one of the most important innovations of bio-
science in the 21st century.3 It allows scientists to edit
gene sequences in an effective manner, akin to a word
processor. This is a sharp improvement from pre-
existing methods like Transcription Activator-Like
Effector Nucleases (TALENs) and Zinc-Finger
Nucleases (ZFNs) in biological research.4
CRISPR is an adaptive immune process first noticed in
bacteria. Jennifer Doudna, of the University of California,
and Emmanuelle Charpentier, now at the Max Planck
Institute for Infection Biology, published an article in
2012 demonstrating the use of this process to edit genome
sequences in vitro (‘Jinek 2012’).5 By delivering a synthetic
RNA protein, the CRISPR-Cas9 enzyme could be guided
to a specific gene site. The process enabled them to re-
move specific genes or add new ones and change the ge-
netic sequencing. Doudna and Charpentier filed for a
patent before the USPTO in March 2013.
In December 2012, Dr Feng Zhang of the Broad
Institute, affiliated with MIT and Harvard, filed for a pat-
ent for the use of CRISPR specifically in eukaryotic cells
under an expedited procedure. Within 6 months, the
Broad patent was granted while the one filed by
University of California remained pending even though it
was filed first. Eventually, the University of California pe-
titioned for an interference proceeding before the PTAB.
The interference was decided in favor of the Broad
Institute and an appeal challenging it is pending for dis-
posal at the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.6
A critical analysis of the interference proceeding
between University of California, Berkeley (UC) and
the Broad Institute (Broad) for the patent on the use of
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CRISPR gene editing system is presented here. The arti-
cle briefly reviews the US law on interference proceed-
ings and related case law. It then discusses the practical
consequences of this long-drawn patent battle and
reflects on suitable solutions to meet the innovation
goals of this groundbreaking scientific advancement.
Finally, the article underlines the importance of devel-
oping a just procedure for establishing inventorship.
Broad began by posing an extremely important chal-
lenge to the PTAB. It argued that an essential pre-con-
dition—interference-in-fact which is a threshold
requirement as per 37 CFR section 41.203 (a)—was not
fulfilled in this case; hence the proceeding was not
maintainable. The PTAB had to determine whether
UC’s patent application regarding the use of CRISPR in
an in vitro environment as prior art renders its use in a
eukaryotic environment obvious. Answering in the neg-
ative, the PTAB ruled that there was no interference-in-
fact. Thus, the interference should not have been de-
clared in the first place.
Legal context
The shift from first-to-invent to
first-inventor-to-file
US patent law was, until recently, significantly distinct
from other legal systems. Before the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA), USPTO granted
patents on a first-to-invent basis. This system was char-
acterized by detailed legal mechanisms for determining
priority, including complex technical interference pro-
ceedings.7 It necessitated means for establishing the date
at which an invention was first conceived, often includ-
ing detailed log-book entries meticulously signed and
dated by the inventor and countersigned by a third
party to prove inventorship.8 AIA ushered in a host of
changes to this system the most significant of which
was the adoption of the ‘first inventor-to-file system’.
This transition required that, for all patent applications
with an effective filing date after 15 March 2013, inter-
ference proceedings be abolished. In their place, deriva-
tion proceedings9 were introduced: these retain only
some elements of the interference proceedings and are
conducted in a manner similar to inter partes reviews.10
Thus, as a matter of procedure, petitioners challenging
the validity of any US patent filed after this date are now
required to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that their
patent would prevail in a dispute before the USPTO.
The CRISPR-Cas 9 case is one of the last interference
proceedings in US history. Therefore, a complete un-
derstanding of the tediousness of the process will pave
the way for greater deliberation and clarity on the deri-
vation standards that should be adopted under AIA.
Interference proceedings
When the subject matter of two or more pending pat-
ent applications or of a pending patent application and
an unexpired patent appears to be substantially same,
the first inventor is determined through interference
proceedings.11 Effectively, interference is an inter partes
review which results in a winner-take-all situation.12
The basis of these proceedings is USC section 135 and
they are governed by 37 CFR sections 41.200–41.208.
In practical terms, interference proceedings were rare
especially due to the high costs involved.13 In case of
success, the affected party is given a grace period of 1
year to bring an application from the disclosure of a
patently indistinguishable invention.14
Hearings were held before a bench of three adminis-
trative judges of BPAI (now PTAB). The process could
commence either at the instance of the patent examiner
or by another party.15 The aggrieved party filed a re-
quest with the patent examiner according to 37 CFR
section 41.202. The request must outline counts identi-
fying patent claims as well as the claims which are sub-
stantially similar in the pending patent application or
the unexpired patent.16
Preconditions to an interference
For a successful declaration of interference, two prereq-
uisites must be met. First, the existence of a patentable
subject matter, and secondly, that the patentable subject
matters actually interfere with each other. Generally,
the USPTO makes a threshold ex parte assessment of
the patentability of the subject matter to satisfy the first
7 Josh Lerner and others, ‘Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Preliminary
Small Business Impacts’, June 2015, SBA Advocacy.
8 Dennis Crouch, ‘First to File versus First Inventor to File’, 11 December
2009, PatentlyO <https://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/12/first-to-file-ver
sus-first-inventor-to-file.html> accessed 26 June 2018.
9 See <https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-pat
ent-decisions/trials/derivation-proceeding> accessed 26 June 2018.




11 35 USC s 135 (Pre-AIA).
12 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure s 2138.01(MPEP); Radio Corp of
America v Radio Eng’g Labs, Inc, 293 US 1, 2, 21 USPQ 353, 3534 (1934).
13 Gerald J Mosinghoff, ‘The U.S. First-To-Invent System Has Provided No
Advantage to Small Entities’ (2002) 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y
425.
14 35 USC s 135(b) (Pre-AIA).
15 35 USC s 135(a) (Pre-AIA); 37 CFR s 41.202.
16 37 CFR s 41.203.
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requirement. The second requirement is known as in-
terference-in-fact.
A two-way test is employed to establish whether the
subject matter of a claim of one party would, if considered
prior art, have anticipated or rendered obvious the subject
matter of a claim of the opposing party and vice versa.17
At this point, an interference proceeding commences.
‘Conception’, ‘reduction to practice’ and
‘reasonable diligence’
Priority is established using two factors: conception and
reduction to practice.18 The interference is awarded to
the person who was the first to conceive the idea and
reduce it to practice.19
Conception refers to ‘the complete performance of the
mental part of the inventive act’.20 It is established when
the invention is sufficiently clear for a person skilled in
the art to be able to reduce it to practice without experi-
mentation or exercise of inventive skill.21 Reduction to
practice can be either actual or constructive.22 Actual re-
duction to practice entails the physical manifestation of
the invention. A constructive reduction refers to filing the
patent application with a detailed description of how the
invention would work and how to use it.
Even if the applicant was not the first to reduce to
practice, she can prevail in the interference if she can
show that she worked on the invention with reasonable
diligence to reduce it to practice before the date of the
conception of the opposing party.23
‘Abandonment, suppression and concealment’
The first inventor could lose the priority contest if it
can be shown that the invention was abandoned, sup-
pressed, or concealed.24 Abandonment is measured
from the date of the second inventor’s conception.
Failure to diligently file a patent or to describe the in-
vention in a publicly disseminated document or to use
the invention publicly has been held as abandonment,
suppression or concealment.25 Therefore, once the
invention has been reduced to practice, the length of
time taken to file a patent might lead to an inference of
concealment, suppression or concealment.26 Being the
first to file the patent plays a critical role in determining
inventorship. Delays can advantage the second inventor
considerably in an interference proceeding.
Facts of the CRISPR proceedings
CRISPR is a bacterial immune system that responds to
external attacks from viruses and plasmids. Through the
combination of CRISPR and associated proteins,
CRISPR-derived RNA molecules (crRNA) are able to at-
tack and cleave the DNA of the invading virus.27 Jennifer
Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier, along with a team
of international scientists, are largely credited as the first
to discover this naturally occurring system in bacteria.
They published their findings in March 2012.28
There are three types of CRISPR systems: Doudna’s
laboratory studied the Type-II CRISPR-Cas9 system. It
was found that crRNA connects via base pairs to a trans-
activating RNA (tracrRNA) to form a dual RNA. The
RNA-guided mechanism that elegantly cleaves the DNA
at the desired spot was immediately likened to a pair of
scissors that could snip the DNA easily and efficiently.
The possibilities of employing this system for genome
editing for plants and animals would be a huge break-
through compared to existing technologies such as ZFNs
and TALENs.29 All existing techniques required a double
paired enzyme to cleave DNA; CRISPR, on the other
hand, works with a single enzyme.30 Doudna and
Charpentier won various awards for their discovery and
eventually filed Patent Application No 13, 842, 859 on 13
March 2013, claiming a priority date of 25 May 2012.
Doudna had demonstrated the use of CRISPR in an
in vitro environment. The patent claims were not limited
to any specific environment and seemingly extended to
all uses of CRISPR.31
Meanwhile, Feng Zhang of the Broad Institute worked
on developing the CRISPR system in a eukaryotic
17 37 CFR s 41.203(a); Lawrence and others, ‘Interference Proceedings:
When Inventions Collide’ <http://www.buildingipvalue.com/n_us/137_
141.htm > accessed 26 June 2018; See also Eli Lilly 5 & Co v Bd Regents
Univ Wash, 334 F 3d 1264, 1270 (Fed Cir 2003).
18 35 USC s 102(g) (Pre-AIA).
19 ibid.
20 MPEP, s 2138.04; Townsend v Smith, 36 F 2d 292, 295, 4 USPQ 269, 271
(CCPA 1930).
21 Hiatt v Ziegler, 179 USPQ 757, 763 (Bd Pat Inter 1973).
22 MPEP, s 2138.05.
23 35 USC s 102(g) (Pre-AIA); Keizer v Bradley, 270 F 2d 396, 399-400
(CCPA 1959).
24 35 USC s 102(g) (Pre-AIA).
25 MPEP, s 2138.03; Correge v Murphy, 705 F 2d 1326, 1330, 217 USPQ 753,
756 (Fed Cir 1983).
26 MPEP, s 2138.03(I); Paulik v Rizkalla, 760 F 2d 1270, 1271, 226 USPQ
225, 226 (Fed Cir 1985).
27 See n 1; see also USPTO Interference Decision on Motions, Patent
Interference No 104,048 (DK) (‘USPTO Interference Decision on
Motions’) 2–3 generally.
28 See n 5.
29 Thomas Gaj and others, ‘ZFN, TALEN, and CRISPR/Cas-based Methods
for Genome Engineering’ (2013) 31 Trends in Biotechnology 397
<http://www.cell.com/trends/biotechnology/pdf/S0167-7799(13)00087-
5.pdf> accessed 26 June 2018.
30 Re patent application of Jennifer Doudna et al., Patent Appl No 13/
842,859, 11.
31 Brief for Appellants, 14, Regents of Univ Cal v Broad Inst, Inc, No 17-1907
(Fed Cir, 25 July 2017).
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environment. Broad filed their patent application with a
priority date of 12 December 2012, under a special appli-
cation. Shortly afterwards, Zhang also published his find-
ings.32 Due to the expedited procedure, Broad’s
application was reviewed within 6 months and the patent
was granted while the one filed by UC remained pending.
Broad’s claim was limited to the use of CRISPR to eu-
karyotic cells; UC’s claims were broader.
Eukaryotic cells refer to plant and animal cells. This
meant that all the commercially relevant uses of CRISPR
such as genetically modified crops and curing genetic dis-
eases would actually vest in the Broad patent. UC filed its
request for an interference shortly afterwards, during the
prosecution of its own patent application at the USPTO.
Globally, various research laboratories and companies
have been eager to jump on the CRISPR bandwagon,
which seems to be promising billions of dollars as the
technology is extended to genome editing and appears
useful in several sectors including medicine, agriculture
and industrial biotechnology. Feng Zhang was a co-
founder of Editas Medicine. Editas has obtained a patent
from the Broad Institute and wants to begin clinical trials
soon. Jennifer Doudna, who was also a co-founder of
Editas, has distanced herself from the company after the
Broad patent and associated herself with Caribou
BioSciences. Emmanuelle Charpentier, on the other
hand, has sold her rights to CRISPR Therapeutics, yet an-
other start-up. Most of these companies have raised large
funds through Initial Public Offerings and venture
capitalists.33
This turn of events eventually led to a high-stakes,
winner-take-all interference between UC’s patent appli-
cation and Broad’s patent.34 In January 2016, the inter-
ference proceeding was announced. The proceeding was
concluded on 15 February 2017, when the PTAB ruled
in the favor of Broad, stating there was no interference-
in-fact since neither party’s claims, if considered to be
prior art, would render the opposing claim obvious.35
Hence, the PTAB did not invalidate any claims.
Following this, UC has filed an appeal before the US
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging
the ruling.36 The appeal is pending disposal.
Analysis
The patent interference identified Broad as the junior
party and The Regents of UC Berkeley along with
University of Vienna and Emmanuelle Charpentier
(collectively ‘UC’) as the senior party based on their ef-
fective filing dates. Broad was successful in showing
that there was no interference-in-fact between UC’s
claims and its own. It argued that its claims were not
rendered obvious by UC’s claims when considered as
prior art.37 The motion succeeded and UC lost its
standing in the interference. Therefore, the interference
was disposed of in the preliminary stage and no argu-
ments were heard on the issue of priority thereon.
Interference-in-fact as precondition to
interference proceedings
The PTAB exercised discretion and sought to hear
Broad’s motion first to decide whether the interference
could be declared in the first place or not.38 The parties’
respective claims were compared to determine if they in-
terfered in fact. Reliance was placed on the two-way test
outlined above and the specific points of enquiry were:
(i) Would UC’s claim be rendered obvious if Broad’s
claim is considered prior art?
and
(ii) Would Broad’s claim be rendered obvious if UC’s
claim is considered prior art?
To declare an interference,39 the answer to both ques-
tions should be in the positive.40 UC admitted that the
first query should be answered in the negative. All of
Broad’s claims were limited to the use of CRISPR in a
eukaryotic environment. This limitation was not con-
tained in any of UC’s claims which seemingly extended
to all uses of CRISPR. The PTAB noted that to consti-
tute anticipation, each limitation of a claim should be
found in a single reference, either expressly or inher-
ently.41 Therefore, Broad only had to show that, on a
preponderance of evidence,42 its claims would not be
rendered obvious by UC’s claims if they were consid-
ered to be prior art.43
32 Le Cong and others, ‘Multiplex Genome Engineering Using CRISPR/Cas
Systems’ (2013) 339 Science 819.
33 Joe Stanganelli, ‘Interference: a CRISPR Patent Dispute Roadmap’, BioIT
World, 9 January 2017 <http://www.bio-itworld.com/2017/1/9/interfer
ence-a-crispr-patent-dispute-roadmap.aspx > accessed 26 June 2018.
34 Antonio Regalado, ‘Crispr Patent Fight Now a Winner Take All match’,
MIT Tech Law Rev, 15 April 2015 <https://www.technologyreview.com/
s/536736/crispr-patent-fight-now-a-winner-take-all-match/> accessed 26
June 2018.
35 Broad Inst, Inc v Regents Univ Cal, No 106,048, 2017 WL 657415 (PTAB,
15 February 2017).
36 See n 30.
37 Broad Motion 2, Paper 77; USPTO Interference Decision on Motions,
7–8.
38 USPTO Interference Decision on Motions, 8, lines 4–8.
39 ibid 9–10.
40 See n 15.
41 USPTO Interference Decision on Motions, 11, lines 29–30 citing Atofina
v Great Lakes Chem 048 Corp, 441 F 3d 991, 999 (Fed Cir 2006).
42 37 CFR s 41.208(b).
43 USPTO Interference Decision on Motions, 10, lines 3–5.
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Obviousness as ‘reasonable expectation of
success’
The PTAB first outlined the John Deere principles as the
test of obviousness.44 According to them, it is necessary
to determine (i) the scope and the contours of the prior
art, (ii) the differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue and (iii) the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art.45 UC’s use of CRISPR in a generic envi-
ronment was considered as prior art, which was com-
pared to Broad’s narrower claim in a eukaryotic cell
environment. The PTAB then tried to discern the level
of ordinary skill in the art by relying on Re Dow
Chemical to determine obviousness.46
The test is whether the prior art would have sug-
gested, to a person having ordinary skill in the art, that
this process should be carried out and would have a
reasonable likelihood of success.47 Doudna’s and
Charpentier’s 2012 article demonstrated the use of
CRISPR in vitro and discovered its presence in prokary-
otic cells. The entire interference hinged on ascertaining
whether UC’s claim of using CRISPR in a generic envi-
ronment would have led to a reasonable expectation of
success in using CRISPR in an eukaryotic environment.
Conflicting contemporaneous statements
undermine reasonable expectation of success
Broad argued that, even though CRISPR was shown to
work in prokaryotic environment, those skilled in the
art did not believe that it would also work in eukaryotic
cells, as claimed in their patent application.48 Broad
pointed out that Doudna herself questioned the ease of
applying CRISPR to eukaryotic cells. Various state-
ments were quoted to explain that she was ‘unsure if
CRISPR-Cas9 would work in eukaryotes’ and that she
had experienced ‘many frustrations’. She had stated
that the modifications required making these technolo-
gies work in animals and humans had been ‘a huge bot-
tleneck in human therapeutics’.49 UC argued that these
statements should be taken to mean that the use of
CRISPR in eukaryotes was clearly foreseeable and only
experimental demonstration was left.
Agreeing with Broad, the PTAB held that, while
there could be an eagerness to learn the results of
experiments in eukaryotic cells, an expectation that the
results would be successful was undermined by
Doudna’s statements. If the inventors were unsure, per-
sons of ordinary skill would surely not reasonably ex-
pect any success.50
UC presented Dr Dana Carroll of the University of
Utah, and Dr Carol Greider of the John Hopkins
University School of Medicine as expert witnesses.51 Dr
Carroll’s testimony attempted to demonstrate how the
use of CRISPR in eukaryotes could be reasonably
expected. Established methods such as codon optimiza-
tion, manipulations of ions and pH made it foreseeable
that CRISPR could be successfully modified for a eu-
karyotic environment. However, the testimony was dis-
counted by contemporaneous statements made by
Dr Carroll himself at the time Jinek 2012 was published.
He expressed his doubt stating that, ‘there is no guaran-
tee that Cas9 will work effectively on a chromatin target
or that the required DNA-RNA hybrid can be stabilized
in that context’.52 The PTAB observed that contempo-
raneous evidence is to be given more weight, as testi-
mony is specifically prepared for the proceedings.53
UC presented other contemporaneous evidence and
commentaries that allegedly suggested it was ‘immedi-
ately obvious’ to use the system for genome engineer-
ing.54 CRISPR’s comparison to ZFNs and TALENs
indicated that it could be employed in eukaryotes. The
PTAB, however, disagreed. It held that these statements
were positive and forward-looking, but only indicated a
‘possibility’ or ‘potential’ and did not translate to an ex-
pectation of success.55
UC’s case was considerably weakened by conflicting
statements contemporaneously made by Dr Doudna,
the inventor and Dr Carroll, the expert witness. This
may lay down an undesirable standard for scientists
where they may be incentivized to be dishonest about
their scientific research.56
Wide-scale experimentation in eukaryotes
does not evidence ‘reasonable expectation of
success’
UC argued that the large number of scientific groups
who were able to employ CRISPR in eukaryotic cells
immediately after the publication of Jinek 2012, should
be taken as evidence of a reasonable expectation of
44 ibid 12, lines 10–12.
45 Graham v John Deere Co Kansas City, 383 US 1, 17 (1966).
46 USPTO Interference Decision on Motions, 12, lines 18–21.
47 Re Dow Chemical Co, 837 F 2d 469, 473 (Fed Cir 1988).
48 USPTO Interference Decision on Motions, 13, lines 7–10.
49 ibid 15.
50 ibid 17, lines 14–16.
51 ibid 4, lines 14–16.
52 ibid 19, lines 15–17.
53 ibid 14; See also Cucuras v Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 993 F
2d 1525, 1528 (Fed Cir 1993).
54 ibid 21–22.
55 ibid 22, lines 17–19.
56 Sharon Begley, ‘The CRISPR Patent Decision: Your Six Takeaways’,
Statþ, 16 February 2017 <https://www.statnews.com/2017/02/16/crispr-
patent-decision-six-takeaways/> accessed 26 June 2018.
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success.57 The PTAB distinguished motivation from a
reasonable expectation of success by opining that the
eager movement towards this direction does not neces-
sarily mean that the experiments were being carried out
with a reasonable expectation of success.58 A scientist’s
‘belief’ in the success of his/her own experiment does
not necessarily mean that there was a reasonable expec-
tation of success indicating obviousness. If this ‘belief’
was sufficient, the requirement of ‘reasonable expecta-
tion of success’ would be rendered meaningless.
Reasonable expectation of success for
scientific experiments to be assessed on
a case-by-case basis
The PTAB referred to the Federal Court decision in
Abbott Labs v Sandoz, Inc, 544 F 3d 1341, 1352 (Fed Cir
2008) which held that, in the case of scientific experi-
ments, instead of employing a presumption of obvious-
ness, the case must be decided in its particular
context.59 The evidence in this case was compared to
the facts of several precedential cases,60 and it was con-
cluded that obviousness depended heavily on what was
known from the prior art of closely related subject mat-
ter. Availability of specific instructions or success in
similar methods or products usually led to a finding of
reasonable expectation of success. Only generalized
instructions and evidence of failure with similar subject
matter have indicated the opposite.61
Accordingly, the PTAB assessed if there were instruc-
tions in prior art specifically relevant to CRISPR that
would instruct those of ordinary skill to use the tech-
nique in eukaryotic cells. They also assessed if there
were examples in prior art of the success or failure of
similar systems.
According to Broad’s expert witness, ordinarily
skilled scientists knew of various differences in prokary-
otic and eukaryotic cells that would hinder the use of
CRISPR in eukaryotic cells. More specifically, the
tightly packed DNA in eukaryotic cells would pose a
challenge as compared to the naked plasmid DNA used
in Jinek 2012.62 Dr Simons additionally argued that
protein folding in eukaryotes would also pose chal-
lenges as misfolded proteins in eukaryotes are degraded
in a manner unlike prokaryotes.63 UC argued that these
differences would not be impediments.
In the cross-examination, Dr Simons admitted that
none of the challenges identified by him were actually
faced by the Broad Institute. The PTAB did not con-
sider this relevant as the question before them was
whether scientists would have expected to face these
challenges and not if they actually faced them.64
UC opposed Dr Simons’ claims by relying on its
own witnesses, Dr Greider and Dr Carroll. According
to them, protein folding would not be an expected im-
pediment, as other prokaryotic proteins were known to
fold properly. It was also well known that functional
proteins could be injected directly into eukaryotic cells.
They addressed concerns raised against a tightly packed
DNA in eukaryotes and pointed out that various meth-
ods, such as codon optimization and pH balancing,
were available to tackle the differences between a pro-
karyotic and eukaryotic environment.65
The PTAB once again pointed to Dr Carroll’s con-
temporaneous statements, which questioned whether
‘Cas9 could effectively work on a chromatic target’.66 It
decided that Broad’s arguments were on a balance
more compelling and that success with select prokary-
otic proteins would not have provided those of ordi-
nary skill with a reasonable expectation that CRISPR
would work in an eukaryotic chromatin.67
Broad also presented several examples of failed attempts
to transfer other prokaryotic RNS-based systems to eu-
karyotic environments,68 while UC argued that Dr
Simon’s testimony itself showed that all these systems
would eventually work in an eukaryotic environment.69
The PTAB noted that all the systems pointed out by Broad
required a unique set of conditions specifically tailored to
the particular system. UC did not draw any commonality
between these conditions and those that can be applied to
CRISPR. It appeared CRISPR would also require its own
specific set of conditions.70 UC and the Broad disagreed
over various scientific questions, including the characteri-
zation of other gene editing technologies such as ZFNs
and TALENs. Overall, the PTAB could not find any spe-
cific instructions relevant to CRISPR to allow its imple-
mentation in a eukaryotic environment. It was persuaded
that the failures of other systems would have contributed
to a lack of a reasonable expectation of success.
57 USPTO Interference Decision on Motions, 23, lines 7–9 .
58 ibid 23, lines 15–18; 24, lines 13–16.
59 ibid 25, lines 24–25.




64 ibid 31, lines 3–5.
65 ibid 33.
66 ibid 33, line 7.
67 ibid 35.
68 ibid 35, lines 17–18.
69 ibid 39; line 1.
70 ibid 39, lines 8–10.
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Reliance on third-party provisional
applications as prior art is not permissible
Finally, UC attempted to rely on another provisional
application (Kim provisional) and its own applications
to prove that Broad’s application was rendered obvious.
The Kim provisional claimed the possibility of using
the CRISPR taught in Jinek 2012 for genome editing in
cells and organisms.71 UC argued that, as the Kim
provisional had been filed prior to Broad’s patent
application, it would constitute prior art and
render Broad’s claim obvious. However, the PTAB de-
cided that this was a question of patentability not of
interference-in-fact. Further, the Kim provisional and
other applications were not informative because the
contents of those applications were not public. Prior
art other than the party’s claims can be considered
only to decide what those of ordinary skill knew at
the time.72
The PTAB concluded that, on a preponderance of
evidence, Broad had succeeded in showing that there
was no interference-in-fact. Accordingly, UC was de-
prived of any standing to bring any other challenges to
Broad in the interference. No judgment was entered
against either party’s claims.
Practical significance
The PTAB ruling provides guidance on the concept of
obviousness in biotechnology patents. Once the basics
of a technique are well known—does the application of
the technology in different contexts become obvious?73
This decision unequivocally answers the question in the
negative. The query hinged mostly on the reasonable
expectation of success in using the technology in a dif-
ferent context.
The appeal before the US Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit may delve into those possibilities.74
Uncertainty in this regard may stall the commercializa-
tion of the technology for significant time.75 The entire
patent dispute may even be rendered redundant with
swift technological advances in the field.76 If a more
commercially viable solution is made available any time
soon, the dispute between Broad and UC might ulti-
mately be of very little importance.77
At a practical level, it is unclear which patent allows
use of the technique. UC’s patents are broadly worded
while Broad’s patents are limited to use in eukaryotic
cells. In Doudna’s words, ‘they have the patent to all
green tennis balls while we have the patent to all tennis
balls’.78 This means that companies might need to ob-
tain a licence from both patentees to avoid liability.79
Despite the interference proceeding, it also remains
unclear whether UC’s patent would cover all uses of
CRISPR. This could drive up the cost of commercializa-
tion. An elegant solution would be a settlement between
the two patentees: indeed, many have expressed their
surprise that a settlement has not yet been reached.80 A
USPTO Communication acknowledges the possibility
of more challenges, including additional interferences
by other CRISPR-centric biotech companies.81
Prior to the transition to the first-inventor-to-file
system in the USA, the long and expensive process of
interference was suspected to often lead to abandon-
ment of patent applications altogether. The prohibitive
cost of having to prove the date of conception pre-
vented several small or independent inventors from
claiming inventorship. Thus, in such instances, the sec-
ond to conceive could often succeed in their claim. In
that regard, AIA caters to the interests of such inventors
and allows for greater certainty in determining inven-
torship in a less cumbersome manner.
AIA has sought to eliminate principles such as ‘con-
ception of invention’ and ‘reduction to practice’, which
characterize the ‘first to invent notion’. However, it was
clarified by the former USPTO Director that there are
systemic checks to protect the interests of the first in-
ventor: ‘[t]here is no risk of someone who learns about
your invention being able to beat you to the patent of-
fice; because they’re not an inventor. As you know, any
filer has to sign an oath and declaration under penalty
of criminal sanctions.’82
71 ibid 46, lines 15–17.
72 ibid 48, lines 1–2.
73 Jacob S Sherkow, ‘Law, History and Lessons in the CRISPR Patent
Conflict’ (2015) 33 Nat Biotechnol 256.
74 See n 34.
75 Heidi Ledford, ‘Broad Institute Wins Bitter Battle over CRISPR Patents’
Nature, 15 February 2017 <http://www.nature.com/news/broad-insti
tute-wins-bitter-battle-over-crispr-patents-1.21502> accessed 26 June
2018.
76 Sarah Buhr, ‘Scientists Have Eliminated HIV in Mice using CRISPR’
TechCrunch, 4 May 2017 <https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/03/scien
tists-have-eliminated-hiv-in-mice-using-crispr/> accessed 26 June 2018.
77 See n 54.
78 See Doudna’s interview at: Sarah Buhr, ‘CRISPR-Cas9 Inventor Jennifer
Doudna’s Plans on Moving Forward, Genetically Modifying Humans’,
TechCrunch, 15 February 2017 <https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/15/
crispr-cas9-inventor-jennifer-doudnas-plans-on-moving-forward-geneti
cally-modifying-humans/> accessed 26 June 2018.
79 See n 75.
80 Sarah Zhang, ‘How the CRISPR Dispute Became So Heated’, The
Atlantic, 6 December 2016 <https://www.theatlantic.com/science/ar
chive/2016/12/crispr-patent-in-court/509579/> accessed 26 June 2018.
81 Office Communication in US Patent Application No 15/435, 233, 15
December 2017.
82 David Kappos, ‘Director’s Forum: A Blog From Uspto’s Leadership’, 10
November 2009 <https://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/director_s_
forum_david_kappos> accessed 26 June 2018.
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The new system under AIA aimed at simplifying the
procedural hurdles in proving inventorship. The year-
long grace period to file a thorough application accom-
panied by a greater breadth of disclosure, including the
best mode to practice the invention, is encouraging.
Inventors can file for the patent after making a com-
plete public disclosure of the invention in any way or
may even conduct the first sale prior to filing, which is
expected to result in better quality patent applications,
fewer post-grant invalidations and improved patent
commercialization practices.
As a matter of law, post-AIA any US inventor who
has priorly published information regarding their in-
vention cannot be denied a patent due to another that
has obtained or derived a subsequent disclosure from
such publication. In this dispute, Broad is allegedly the
‘deriving party’ that has presented sufficient evidence to
disprove the allegation raised by UC at the first in-
stance. The reform introduced by AIA actually enhances
the requirement for this evidence that authenticates
who is the true inventor by seeking to corroborate
inventorship, producing proof regarding conception of
the invention and reducing it to actual or constructive
practice by filing the patent application. Lack of evi-
dence causes the date of filing the application to be
noted as the only date of invention. Also, ‘derivation
proceedings’ are only concerned with the person who
filed first, whether or not she is the inventor. Once the
required affidavitory evidence of authorization is pre-
sented, the priority stands. It is an extension of the inter
partes and post-grant review processes. Thus, if the
CRISPR-Cas9 dispute had arisen post-AIA, the ruling
may have favoured UC on account of the date of filing.
However, such determination would not include the in-
terpretation of the broadly worded claims or their pos-
sible negative impact on innovation. Procedurally, the
case is a better fit for a pre-AIA priority contest.
CRISPR technology patents: suggestions for a
way forward
Broadly worded patents can create serious market inef-
ficiencies.83 Currently, market exclusivities and appro-
vals, as well as compliances for treatments concerning
CRISPR-Cas9 technologies, are governed by the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 2009
(BPCIA).84 However, broadly worded patents would re-
sult in very restrictive licensing of the patent so much
so that even academic research may be prohibited in
addition to impeding scientific progress. Though this
might be entirely speculative, given the rapid progress
with CRISPR, Sherkow suggests to look at other paral-
lels and examples of innovation in biotechnology to
evolve fair practices for transferring technology.
Stanford’s management of the Cohen–Boyer patent
provides a helpful example. The University granted
non-exclusive licences, allowing non-profits to use the
research tools without a licence, and provided a stag-
gered royalty framework to ensure that small businesses
are not unfairly affected.85 Similarly, one of MIT’s
‘Tuschl patents’ can be used by scientists for free and
companies are granted non-exclusive licences for most
types of commercial research.86 If ongoing discussions
on creating a worldwide CRISPR-Cas9 licensing pool
succeed, the actual impact on innovation will be wit-
nessed and possibly even measured as a gold standard.87
Hence, the effect that pooling would have on such an
arrangement will need close and careful study to be
considered a worthwhile parallel measure. The poly-
merase chain reaction patents provide another unique
example, where a system of ‘rational forbearance’ was
followed and scientists refrained from suing each other
for research.88 A similar approach can be used for
CRISPR patents, to make sure that overly restrictive li-
censing does not stall scientific research in the long run,
but proves to be a win-win for all concerned.
83 See n 73.
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